英文摘要 |
Prior literature asserted that the control rights of controlling shareholders are often larger than cash flow rights of them, and while the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders is larger, the agency problem will be seriously. Therefore, the first research purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders and the firm's performance. In addition, previous studies also pointed out the ownership of controlling shareholders has the moderating effects on the above relationship. Then, the next purpose of this work is to examine whether the ownership of controlling shareholders has the moderating effects on the above relationship. Moreover, related literature suggested the type of controlling shareholders also influence the effect of control-cash flow right deviation on firm's performance; therefore, the third purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the type of controlling shareholders will change the effect of control-cash flow right deviation and ownership on firm's performance. Using firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei exchange from 2009 to 2013 as the sample, the empirical results show that the relationship between the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders and the firm's performance is negative. In addition, the ownership of controlling shareholders and the single family control both have the moderating effects on the above negative relationship. The results of this study complement the existing literature and serve as reference for companies trying to build corporate governance mechanism. |