分析師提供現金流量預測是否影響公司採用現金流量作為高階經理人之績效衡量指標

Does Analysts' Cash Flow Forecast Affect Firms' Choice of Operating Cash Flow Metrics as Performance Measure?

本研究探討分析師對於營業現金流量的預測，是否影響到公司使用現金流量作為高階管理階層薪酬之績效衡量指標。分析師提供現金流量預測，將導致市場上對該公司的現金流量增加關注，此關注將會影響到公司股價及現金流量間之關聯性(Call2008)。我們預期此現象將會提高薪酬委員會使用現金流量作為高階主管績效衡量指標的可能性，以激勵高階主管朝提高公司股價的目標努力。我們並進一步探討以現金流量作為CEO薪酬績效衡量指標是否提高該公司操縱營業現金流量之可能性。本研究以1993至2011年間S&P500公司中分析師有提供盈餘預測者作為樣本，實證結果顯示：分析師的營業現金流量預測對於公司激勵薪酬制度中現金流量指標的採用有顯著的正向影響。此外，當公司以現金流量作為CEO績效指標時，可能增加公司於第四季透過加速收款及延遲還款的方式，操縱期末來自營業活動現金流量之可能性。

This study examines whether firms with analysts' cash flow forecasts are more likely to use operating cash flows (OCF) as performance measures in CEO incentive compensation contracts. When analysts provide both earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts for a firm, investors will pay higher attention to the firm's cash flows, which increases the value relevance of cash flows (Call 2008). Therefore, we expect that compensation committees in firms with analysts' cash flow forecasts are more likely to use OCF as performance measures to motivate CEOs to increase firm values. Moreover, we examine whether the use of OCF as performance measures in compensation plan increases firms' tendency to manipulate operating cash flows. Focusing on S&P 500 firms with available analysts forecasts data from 1993 to 2011, we show that the provision of analysts' OCF forecasts is positively associated with the likelihood that firms include OCF metrics in CEO compensation plan. We also find that the use of OCF to gauge CEO's performance when designing compensation contracts might lead CEOs to inflate reported operating cash flows through timing certain transactions such as delaying payments to suppliers or accelerating collections from customers in the fourth quarter.