中國哲學的特質在於主體性嗎？──試論儒學在後現代語境中的自我定位

Is the Subjectivity the Essence of Chinese Philosophy? On the Self-constellation of Confucianism in the Postmodern Language Context

本文之作，基本上是從當代儒學詮釋的分化著手，在參酌近年來大陸學界有關從「後現代」視域重新定位儒學的討論之後，嘗試針對儒學義理性格的歸屬，提出分析。全文分別從兩個議題展開討論。一是儒學的特質是否可以從「主體性」這個概念來規定。另一則是在「後現代」一片反形上學的聲浪中，檢討儒學是否還要維持「形上學」的身分。根據本文的分析，我們發現當代新儒家牟宗三先生在「主體性」概念的運用中，意義並不一致。有時牟先生是要藉「主體性」概念凸顯儒家重生命實踐的存在進路，有時則是為了要證成儒學的「自律道德性」，逕自將主體性簡化等同於「實踐理性」。如果我們維持第一個涵義來理解儒家，則儒家與「後現代」的語境調性並無不一致的情形，但若堅持第二個涵義，則不免與後現代的文化氛圍格格不入。至於第二個問題，關鍵在於我們若能放棄以「實體」為核心的西方古典形上學的框架，從哲學詮釋學來重新展開天人關係的理解，則儒學是否一定要保留「形上學」這一身分，其實爭議性並不大。

The writing of this article is running in according to the differentiation of the contemporary interpretations about Confucianism. In viewing the reconstellation of Confucianism which was made up by Mainland Chinese scholars within the horizon of the post-modern, I try to analyze the theoretical characteristics of Confucianism. This article includes two themes: 1. To question whether the essence of Confucianism can or can't be characterized with the concept of “subjectivity.” 2. To examine whether the Confucianism is necessary to maintain its “metaphysical” status under the anti-metaphysic tide of the “Post-modern.” According to our analysis, we find that the contemporary Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan did not consistent in using the concept “subjectivity.” Sometimes he took up with the concept of “subjectivity” to stick up the existential approach which revealed the Confucians' emphasis of praxis in life, but sometimes he reduced the “subjectivity” as equal to “practical reason” in order to justify the “autonomous morality” of Confucianism. If we cognize the Confucianism in according to the first consideration, then it will be in tune with the tone of the “Post-modern”; but if we insist on the second consideration, then it will be incompatible with the post-modern culture. And for the second question it will be solved, if we can abandon the Western substance-based classical metaphysics and try again to understand the Heaven-Human Beings relationship from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, then it will not be problematic for whether the Confucianism should to maintain its status as “metaphysics” or not.