唐牟二先生對他人心靈與性善的普遍性的論述

Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan's Discussion on the Other Mind and the Goodness and the Universality of Human Nature

孟子的性善論是儒家倫理的基石，但自戰國的荀子以至清朝的戴震，都對此學說提出質疑。當代中國哲學學者更以邏輯分析方法挑戰孟子論証的有效性。當然亦有不少學者對性善論提出疏解及闡釋，給予此學說有力的支持。當代新儒學中心人物唐君毅與牟宗三二先生以其對傳統儒學的深厚及精闢的理解，反復論述性善論於道德哲學中的意義，並指出其有效性須賴「體証」的方式得以証成。但此體証方式或對於個體自身有效，對於「人皆有之」的論斷卻未必盡然。本文試圖研究唐牟二先生對上述問題的有關觀點與論辨，從而賦予性善論堅實的理論基礎。

“Good human nature” is the most significant ground of the autonomous morality in Confucianism. However, there were continuous misunderstandings as well as attacks towards this doctrine since its advocate by Mengzi. The problem of justification is particularly urgent for contemporary philosophers who have undergone western philosophical training. In this paper I would like to reveal the expositions and argumentations of this issue by two leading Contemporary Neo-Confucian thinkers: Mr. Mou Zhong-san and Tang Jun-i. The way of reflective justification was adopted by both of these two thinkers as a valid justification, which is quite controversial. Moreover, it is arguable that even though this way is sound for affirming the good nature of an individual who has the special experience required for the justification, the problem as whether this validity also applies to other people still remains. Besides, the discussion of the issues mentioned above may involve the problem of other mind, which I am going to tackle if deemed necessary.