預售制度下建商銷售時機選擇之實證分析

Developer Selection of Selling Time under the Housing Presale System

以往文獻鮮少針對建商的實際推案行為進行實證分析，為釐清何種建商與住宅產品傾向提前預售，進而評估政府是否應針對建商的預售資格進行更嚴格的規範。本文在控制不同建商所面對的區域環境差異下，以台北大學特定區為研究範圍，實證結果發現並非所有的建商都會提前出售，多數建商仍會依據本身條件與建案特性決定是否提前出售，當建案的區位條件越佳、預期未來景氣越好時，建商會傾向提前銷售，而當建案規模較大時建商將延後銷售，上述結果某種程度可避免潛在交易糾紛的發生機率。不過，因部分廣設子公司的集團型建商亦傾向提前銷售，此可能提高未來交易糾紛風險，且建商資本額對其銷售時機選擇的影響亦未達顯著水準，隱含建商可能有過度財務槓桿操作與輕忽資金積壓的潛在問題。整體而言，現行住宅預售市場機制尚稱良好，但仍有應注意的潛在風險，值得未來持續加以改善。

To assess whether governments need stricter regulations on the housing presale market, this study used the actual selling data of developers in the Taipei Special District to clarify the developers and products that prefer early sale. Our empirical results yield several interesting findings. First, Lai et al. (2004) argued that the best strategy for developers to share risks under the presale system was to sell as early as possible. However, we found that not all developers favor early sale. Second, for projects with a good location and expectations of improving future conditions, developers will prefer to sell earlier. Third, for projects with a larger development scale, developers will prefer to sell later. Based on the above results, this study concluded that the market mechanism works well without serious government intervention in the housing presale market. However, we also found that developers with numerous independent subsidiary companies preferred to sell earlier, and the influences of developer capital were not significant. Homebuyers thus still face some risks in buying a presale house.