董事會與審計委員會開會次數的決定因素之研究：東亞驗證

The Determinants of Meeting Frequency for Board of Directors and Audit Committee

本文使用香港、新加坡、馬來西亞三個股巿的大型上巿公司為樣本，調查它們為何要揭露董事會與審計委員會開會次數，以及開會次數多寡的決定因素。我們首先發現家族控股公司比較不會揭露開會次數。再者本文提出巿場壓力假說，認為當控制股東現金流量權偏離投票權愈大的公司，其屬於鞏固職位型，比較會揭露開會次數；而獨立董事比率高的公司，在巿場壓力下，亦比較會揭露開會次數。而控制股東現金流量權愈高、過去績效較佳的公司，其屬於正面誘因者，比較沒有市場壓力，因此比較不用揭露開會次數，以及有揭露者亦開比較少次的會議。本文的實證結果，在揭露董事會與審計委員會開會次數，以及開會次數多寡，具有一致性。

Using 450 listed firms in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, the threeregions that were once the colonies of the U.K. and inherit the sameAnglo-American legal system, we investigate the issue of why firms would like toreveal board meeting information and how frequent the meetings are scheduled. Wepropose the market pressure hypothesis indicating that the listed firms, especiallyfor family controlled ones, would passively react to outside pressure in the decisionof whether to disclose board meeting information and calling meetings. Theempirical evidences show that the listed firms with family controlling ownerentitled higher cash flow rights are associated with lower odds of informationdisclosure. In contrast, the voting-cash flow deviation associated with thecontrolling owners, being characterized as an entrenching motive, is positivelyassociated with the odds of disclosure. Moreover, the odds of disclosure arepositively associated with board independence. Finally, firms with inferiorperformance measures are more likely to be demanded of meeting informationdisclosure. The results in general hold water both for the board of directors and theaudit committee, and are sustainable for the decision of meeting informationdisclosure and the decision of meeting frequency setting.