政府是否應採取透明化政策阻止貨幣危機的發生

SHOULD A GOVERNMENT ADOPT A TRANSPARENT POLICY TO PREVENT A CURRENCY CRISIS

Morris and Shin(1998)將全域賽局的架構引入自我實現的貨幣危機模型中，並利用訊息事件解釋貨幣危機的發生。然而，該模型沒有明確的政府目標。本文考慮總體市場架構，明確定義出貨幣危機的全域賽局中之政府目標函數，利用該政府目標求出政府何時應該採行透明化政策。本文發現：訊息事件可以是導致貨幣危機的一個原因，且只有在透明化的成本非常小之下，政府才可能採取透明化的措施。

Morris and Shin (1998) introduce the global game into the self-fulfilling currency crisis model and show that an informational event would be a trigger for a currency crisis. However, there is no government’s objective explicitly specified in the model. We consider the macroeconomic market to specify the government’s objective in the global game model of currency crisis and use the specific government’s objective to obtain the range of the true fundamentals under which a government should adopt a transparent policy. We have shown that an informational event may trigger a currency crisis, and a government will prevent a currency crisis by adopting a transparent policy when the cost of the transparent policy is small enough.