不完全資訊下出口國與進口國的貿易政策競爭

Rivalry between Exporting Countries and an Importing Country under Incomplete Information

本文採用Brander-Spencer（1985）兩出口國與一進口國的基本模型，來探討當此三國政府皆不知道兩出口廠商的成本時，在進口國採行不同的關稅制度下，兩出口國出口補貼政策的Nash均衡。在線性市場需求及高低兩種成本類型的假設下，本文發現當進口國採行單一關稅制度，兩出口國均課徵單一出口稅。本文亦發現進口國的最適關稅制度為單一關稅制度，但只要兩出口廠商的預期成本差距夠小，兩出口國均偏好歧視性關稅制度。

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) framework to examine the noncooperative Nash equilibrium of export subsidy policy under incomplete information when the firms’ costs are unknown to the exporting and importing countries. With the assumptions of linear demand and two types of a firm’s cost, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is that both exporting countries use a single pooling export subsidy (tax) under a uniform (discriminatory) tariff regime. Moreover, we find that the importing country would optimally choose a uniform tariff regime. However, both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime as long as the expected cost differential between the two firms is small enough.