英文摘要 |
We have developed technologies which have so far improved human wellbeing to an extent unimaginable to our ancestors. But suppose there will still be human beings living on earth hundreds of years from now. It is very likely that, if not properly regulated, our employment of these technologiesmay leave those future people with an environment unbearable for them to live in. Ordinary people would believe that if we knowingly don’t do whatever is necessary to prevent such things from happening to them, we will harm them in an unforgivably wrongful way, or in any case violate their basic human rights when they come to exist. According to this belief, we have moral duties toward these future peoplewhich are based on considerations of so-called “intergenerational justice”. However, some philosophers think that this belief is misguided as a result of one’smisuse of the concepts involved therein, namely, those of “moral rights”, “harm”, and even “justice”. For them, these concepts have no use when it comes to understanding ourmoral relation to peoplewhose life-span does not overlap ours. They would insist that even though we ought by all means to care about the well-being of these future people, this does not stem from duties of justice or of “do no harm”, but at most from duties of beneficence. This article seeks to defend the ordinary belief in question against such a conservative view. |