論西田幾多郎「絕對矛盾的自我同一」的邏輯構造

On the Logical Structure of Nishida’s “Absolute Contradictory Selfidentity”

實在的邏輯為何是古希臘哲學以來的一個主要問題。本文的目的在反省西田場所邏輯對這個問題所可能有的貢獻。對此，我們將討論的焦點置於作為西田場所邏輯之最終形式的「絕對矛盾的自我同一」，並思考其所包含的邏輯與形上學的意義。本文區分為五個節次，首先（壹）在簡短地說明本文的主題之後，我們緊接著（貳）根據西田 1934 年的〈辯證法性全般者的世界〉來釐清「媒介者 M」的邏輯構造。我們先討論（參）西田對柏拉圖的分類法與亞里斯多德的判斷法的批評，以顯示場所邏輯的必要性，並以圓環的限定與直線的限定為例，來顯示絕對矛盾的自我同一所包含的邏輯構造。我們將重點置於「非連續的連續」，並且（肆）以西田宗教哲學中的「逆對應」為線索，來顯示絕對矛盾的自我同一在宗教哲學上的具體運用。最後（伍），我們反省傳統邏輯的限制，並且根據本研究的結果，特別是「非連續的連續」這個概念，來釐清《善的研究》時期中的幾個重要概念。

The problem of the logic of reality has been a key metaphycial issue since the time of ancient Greek. On the basis of Nishida’s idea of “Absolute Contradictory Selfidentity”, which is the final formulation of his logic of basho, the main purpose of this paper is, on the one hand, to explore Nishida’s possible contribution to our understanding of reality, and on the other hand, to focus on the logical structure and metaphysical implication of the idea. The paper is divided into five sections: After a brief introduction of the theme of the paper (section one), by using the ideas collected from Nishida’s “the World as Dialectical Universal” (1934), this paper aims at clarifying the meaning of “Medium M” (section two). In order to highlight the necessity of his logic of nothingness, Nishida’s criticism on Plato’s and Aristotle’s logic is to be discussed. Following from the aforementioned discussion, the paper tries to explicate the logical structure of Nishida’s “Absolute Contradictory Selfidentity” (section three). By using Nishida’s idea of “Inverse Correspondence” as a clue, this paper then turns to focus on Nishida’s “Discontinuous Continuity” and demonstrate its concrete meaning using (section four). Finally, according to Nishida’s later concept of “Discontinuous Continuity”, this paper reflects upon the restriction of traditional logic, and clarify some main concepts in Nishida’s early “Zen no kenkyo” (section five).