無社群與第一人稱錯誤

No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof

布藍登的《說明白》(Making It Explicit) 主張一種實用主義的語意理論 (pragmatic semantics)，他認為他的理論所面臨最大挑戰，是呈現出他的理論不會違反以下這個客觀性原則：我們的態度所關於的對象是超越我們的態度的。布藍登書中總其成的一章是第八章，在該章中，他直接面對那個挑戰，他試圖證明他的理論不會有以下的後果：(p)[(S) （S 宣稱 p） → p] (名為「無社群錯誤條件句」, No Communal Error Condition)。在本文中，我論證布藍登的論證是失敗的，同時我也將證明「無社群錯誤條件句」以及布藍登所謂的「無第一人稱錯誤條件句」(No Communal Error Condition, (p) [（我宣稱p）→ p]) 在適度且微幅的修正下，將可從他的實用主義的語意理論中導出。

Brandom recognizes one of the most serious conceptual chal-lenges facing the pragmatic semantics advocated his Making It Ex-plicit is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes. And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter eight to demonstrate that his account does not force upon it-self the undesirable consequence that (p)[(S) (S claims that p) → p], dubbed the No Communal Error Condition. In this paper, I shall argue that Brandom's proof fails, and, moreover, I prove that both the No Communal Error Condition and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition, (p) [(I claim that p) → p]), with minor modifications, will result from his pragmatic account.