康德於《單在理性範圍內之宗教》中的自由理論

The Theory of Freedom in Kant’s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft

這篇論文的目的是探討康德在《單在理性範圍內的宗教》（以下簡稱《宗教》）一書中的自由理論，而非對其整體的自由理論的全面探討，但我還是對《宗教》一書之前的自由理論作相對簡單的闡述與批評，以作為論證的歷史發展的準備性工作。康德的倫理學是基於作為物自身的自由與作為現象的感性之對立，但如是並不能說明道德如何可能，而只能界限出事實與倫理。在《宗教》一書中，他理解到自由不一定要從物自身上探討，釐清了感性在倫理學的角色，嘗試從先驗意識層面上的對立來理解自由，作為抉擇符合或違反義務的最高條件，是使歸責可能的能力，他統一了在意念中相衝突的存心。因而現象與物自物之區分的形上學困難便得到解決。

In this paper I would not discuss the whole theory of Kant’s freedom, but only the theory in Religion. It is necessary to show the historical development of the concept of freedom in the early works in order to explore why Kant changes the understanding of the concept in this religious work. His ethics depends on the conflict between freedom as thing in itself and sense as appearance. Such understanding doesn’t make the moral as such possible, but only defines the difference between fact and moral. In Religion he shows that it is not necessary to understand the concept of freedom from the viewpoint of thing in itself. He makes clear the role of sense in his ethic and tries to show the concept of freedom through the conflict in the transcendental consciousness as the highest condition of determination for duty or against duty. It is the true ability, which makes the imputation possible because of those free Gesinnungen der Willkür. The freedom unites such Gesinnungen in the conflicts der Willkür. Therefore the metaphysical difficulties with difference between thing in itself and appearance is solved.