專利就像一條河流：從流動性資源的畫界看財產的符號結構

Of a Patent and a River: The Delimitation of Fugitive Resources and the Semiotic Structure of Property Rights

流動性資源的畫定界線，在財產法裡一向是個困難的問題。水權的畫定方法，與專利權的權利範圍畫定方法，二者具有某些重合之處。這些重合之處，顯示對於對象的界定方法，並非財產法或智慧財產權法所獨創，而可能是人類思維的普遍模式之一。在美國的法律唯實主義，財產被當作一束權利。但一束權利的看法，忽視「物」的存在，並且也忽視記號對於界定財產的作用。美國學者Carol Rose論述「眼見」對於財產法的重要性；Henry E. Smith則提議恢復「物」在財產法中的地位，提出財產是「模組物的法律」。Hansmann與Kraakman則提醒規約（convention）對權利範圍界定的作用。財產權理論呈現出三個元素的互動：權利、物、與記號。符號學提出的符號行動（semiosis），適合作為串連這三個元素的架構。在符號學中，皮爾士的三元結構比較適合說明財產關係。從符號行動理解，在一般財產權，財產是資源（物）、輪廓（邊界）、與權利之間的符號關係；在專利權，則是發明、專利、與專利權利範圍之間的符號關係。專利權的權利範圍界定方法，運用意義的判準模式與成規主義，這原則上是形式性的語意操作，但在發生權利範圍與權利的對象不一致時，則必須回到脈絡的實質，也就是均等論與逆均等論。本文最後為上述現象提出法實證主義的解釋。

The delimitation of fugitive resources has always been a difficult issue. The delimitation of water rights and of patent rights has observable similarities, in terms of both using the central delimitation method and the peripheral delimitation method. Trademark law and copyright law also use the central delimitation approach. These points of overlapping show that the ways to delimit the “object” is not the unique creation of property law or intellectual property; instead, these methods may be common models of human thinking. Legal realists consider property as a bundle of rights, which has become the dominant theory of property in American law. Yet the bundle idea ignores the existence of the “thing” (the resource) and the function of the sign for the delimitation of property. American property law scholar Carol Rose has commented on the importance of restoring “seeing” in property law, a theory we can use to construct the basic model of the semantic relation of property. Later, another property law scholar, Henry E. Smith, proposes to restore the status of the “thing” in property law. Smith proposes to define property as the law of “modular things”: modules (boundaries) serve as the bounds of the thing and the bounds of the rights. The construction of modular thing is the construction of the semantic relation of property. Professor Hansmann and Kraakman also remind us of the function of convention for the delimitation of rights. From the reconstruction of property law theory, three interacting elements have emerged—the rights, the thing, and the sign. The concept of semiosis, as proposed by semiotics, can serve as a framework to connect the three elements. Saussure’s semiology is closer to the realist “bundle of rights” theory, since both of them disregard the thing. Peirce’s semiotics, capable of incorporating physical resources into the semiotic structure, is a better candidate for constructing the property relation. Explicated from the perspective of semiosis, property in general embodies the semiotic relation among the resource (thing), the boundaries, and the rights. As to patents, the same relation is among the invention, the patent, and the patent rights. The way to delimit patent rights is to apply the criterial model of meaning and conventionalism in order to determine the corresponding scope of patent rights. In principle, this is a formal semantic operation; however, in case an inconsistency happens between the scope of rights and the object (the invention), the court may deviate from formal semantic operation and go back to the original contexts. In patent law, this is to use the doctrine of equivalents and the reverse doctrine of equivalents to solve the problems of over-inclusion and under-inclusion. Finally, this article provides a legal positivist explanation for these phenomena.