企業之不對稱資訊、銀行往來關係及直接與間接融資

The Enterprises' Asymmetric Information, Banking Relationship, and Direct and Indirect Financing

本研究運用個體理論模型以期觀察企業於資訊不對稱情境下，跨期選擇銀行往來關係、直接與間接融資模式之多期利潤極大化行為。理論模型揭示，若企業的不對稱資訊問題獲致改善（惡化），其多會降低（提升）銀行往來關係的緊密程度，易言之，不對稱資訊疑慮較嚴重的企業遂需維持較緊密的銀行往來關係。此外，具顯著資訊不對稱疑慮的企業，隨其不對稱資訊問題的改善，多傾向藉由銀行借款籌資，然較無資訊不對稱疑慮的優質企業則多偏好直接金融工具籌資。其次，當景氣復甦（衰退）時，公開舉債或現金增資等直接融資工具之融資成本快速攀升（下滑），反觀銀行借款此間接融資之成本相對攀升（下滑）幅度較小，致使企業多維持更緊密（疲弱）的銀行往來關係。最後，若無顯著不對稱資訊疑慮的優質企業，當景氣復甦時多傾向藉由銀行借款籌資，而其直接融資規模多傾向下滑；惟若屬不對稱資訊疑慮較嚴重的企業，則隨景氣攀升，其多傾向依賴直接融資管道而減少銀行借款。是以，公開市場直接融資與私下銀行間接融資雖常扮演彼消我漲的融資替代角色，但渠等於完整景氣循環週期中卻共同扮演缺一不可的融資互補角色。

This study seeks to theoretically investigate the evolution of heterogeneous firms' intertemporal banking relationship, as well as direct and indirect financing patterns mainly from the viewpoint of asymmetric information. The micro-foundation theoretical framework delineates that the improvement of enterprises' asymmetric information problem may result in a less intensive banking relationship. An enterprise with a higher (lower) extent of information asymmetry may have a more intensive (less intensive) banking relationship. An enterprise with a significant (insignificant) information asymmetry problem is more inclined to select indirect (direct) financing arrangements when its creditworthiness or asymmetric information is improved. Besides, economic expansion (depression) could contribute to a more intensive (less intensive) banking relationship due to lower (higher) financing costs from banks or indirect financing, compared to direct financing. An enterprise with a lower (higher) extent of information asymmetry is more inclined to have a higher (lower) level of indirect financing during economic expansion. Although direct and indirect financing are substitutes during a given economic state, they are complements in a complete business cycle.