重新審視牟宗三的〈道德判斷與歷史判斷〉──從現象學的觀點來看

A Rethinking of Mo Zongshan’s Reflection on “Moral Judgment and Historical Judgment”: from the Viewpoint of Phenomenology

牟宗三在〈道德判斷與歷史判斷〉一文裡，對於陳同甫與朱子各自偏重非理性的生命與理性的道德，指出了兩者的不足處，從而主張朱子的道德判斷應引進歷史判斷。他提出在道德方面只是主觀之鑒別與批判，必須提昇至架構地思考客觀的政體與歷史，再而從動的觀點或升舉轉化的立場來進行歷史判斷。本文將從現象學的觀點來看牟宗三所提出的問題，一方面去闡明胡塞爾（Edmund Husserl）、海德格（Martin Heidegger）與漢娜鄂蘭（Hannah Arendt）對之有不同的立場與見解，另一方面去審視牟宗三對於陳與朱的超越如何可再做進一步的發展。

In “Moral Judgment and Historical Judgment,” Mo Zongshan identifies the failure of Chan Tongpu and Zhuzi （who respectively emphasized the irrational life or rational morality） and maintains that Zhuzi should place historical judgment within moral judgment. Mo states that the mere subjective evaluation and critique based on morality must be raised to the level of structurally thinking of the objective polity and history. Only then can one infer an historical judgment from the dynamic and dialectic perspective. I will rethink the issue Mo reflects upon from the phenomenological point of view. On the one hand, I demonstrate the different positions and interpretations of Husserl, Heidegger and Arendt； on the other hand, I argue how Mo’s transcending of Chan and Zhuzi can be developed further. Moreover, Arendt’s contribution to the special meanings of historical judgment and moral judgment will be highlighted in this paper.