從死與死亡的區分開展萊維納斯以倫理觀點對海德格存有論之批判： 以《存在與時間》為例

Levinas' Criticism on Heidegger's Ontology, from the Disparity of Dying and Death to Ethic: An Example on Being and Time

依照萊維納斯對於《存在與時間》的詮釋，雖然海德格試圖區別自身存有論於傳統哲學，但在他以存在為優先所構建的存有論中，人的意涵依然被存在模態所限制，以至於人以及倫理的問題被隱蔽。由此觀點看，萊維納斯對於海德格思想的轉譯與詮釋，所涉及的從存有論轉向倫理的關懷，亦關乎了其回應海德格並發展自身思想的嘗試。在閱讀萊維納斯對於海德格的批判與回應中，我們發現萊維納斯嘗試從死（lemourir）與死亡（lamort）的差異，區分此在與其所關注的責任主體的差異。如果萊維納斯的責任主體是以生存（l’exister）為承擔他人的基礎，那麼海德格思想中與死亡緊密相關的此在這一主體，又將展示為如何的生命情韻（dieStimmung/latonalité）？

According to Levinas' interpretation of Being and Time, although Heidegger attempts to distinguish his ontology from traditional philosophy, in Heidegger's ontology which constructed of taking Being as priority, the implication of man is still restricted to Being's mode, so that the problem of man and ethic has been concealed. From this point of view, Levinas' translation and interpretation of Heidegger's thought, refers to his concern transiting from ontology to ethic, and is also relating to his attempt to respond to Heidegger and effort to develop his own thought. When reading Levinas' criticism and response to Heidegger, we found that Levinas attempts to distinguish Dasein, from the subject of responsibility that he cares, through the difference between “die (le mourir)” and “death (le mort)”. If Levinas' subject of responsibility is based on existence (l'exister) so as to be responsible for others, then the subject Dasein in Heidegger's thought that is bound up tightly with the death, would demonstrate what kind of life tonality (die Stimmung/la tonalité)?