原民會主委的補助款？檢視「基本設施維護費」在原住民55 個鄉、鎮、市、區分配的實證分析

The Chairperson of the Grants? Examining the Distribution of Pork Barrel Projects across Taiwan Indigenous Areas

誰從政治場域中獲得比較多的政策利益？或在政策過程中，能明確主導利益分配？是分配政治研究中時常被提出來討論的研究議題。有鑑於此，本文以分配政治的實證研究為理論基礎，分析專責原住民族公共事務的中央行政機關－－「行政院原住民族委員會」－－補助全國55 個平地與山地原住民鄉、區、鎮、市的「基本設施維持費」，檢視由原住民委員會補助偏鄉經濟發展的政策方案是否會受到政治、族群（平地或山地身分別）、或族別因素所影響？綜合實證分析結果，在控制若干影響因素後，總統選舉得票表現較為脆弱的鄉、鎮、市、區，所獲得補助金額比例明顯高於其他原住民地區。換言之，基本設施維持經費對於中央行政部門來說，不僅是一種調節地方財政發展的政策工具，同時能幫助總統攏絡對手陣營支持者、擴大選票支持的手段。在後續的結論中，本文摘述實證分析要點，並提出影響政策利益分配的研究意涵。

Who gets what, why, and how in legislative processes, and from the appropriation of government spending for localized projects, are commonly being asked by many political researchers. Based on the date of the subsidy for supporting essential infrastructures in Indigenous administrative areas (districts, towns, village, and cities), this paper examines how the Council of Indigenous Peoples, the central government (the Executive Yuan), solely allocated distributive policies with political aims to the each area in Taiwan. The primary result shows that the presidential power has significantly positive effects on the distribution of pork barrel projects. Also, the most vulnerable areas with less vote rate in previous presidential election had received more grants allocated by the Council of Indigenous Peoples, and it also implies that the chairperson in the agency was more preferable to let the vulnerable areas to receive higher particularistic benefits. In sum, the findings have important implications for the field of Taiwanese distributive politics, and the aboriginal studies as well.