國際財務報導準則實施期間之長期性資產評價方法選擇之管理誘因

Managerial Incentives in the Choice for Long-Lived Assets during the IFRS Adoption Period

本研究檢視對於國際財務報導準則 (IFRS) 強制採用期間，長期性資產之評價方法選擇之管理誘因。本研究使用英國上市公司進行管理誘因分析，原因在於採用國際財務報導準則之國家中，英國擁有最大之資本市場，其提供企業管理者對於長期性資產於公允價值與歷史成本間之評價方法選擇具有較高說服力之證據。自2005 至2011 年之樣本期間，本研究以英國上市公司為分析證據顯示：一般而言，經濟誘因、資訊不對稱、契約效率與管理機會主義皆為企業管理者進行長期性資產的公允價值或歷史成本的評價方法選擇的誘因，此結果隱含管理者於評價方法的選擇與國際財務報導之相關準則目的一致。

This study examines managerial incentives in the choice of valuation methods for longlived assets during the mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption period. We employ the firms listed in the United Kingdom (UK) to analyze managerial incentives because the UK has the largest capital market among countries adopting IFRS; thus, this sample of firms provides more convincing evidence regarding the choice of valuation methods between fair value and historical cost for long-lived assets. For a sample period from 2005 to 2011, our evidence generally suggests that economic incentives, information asymmetry, contractual efficiency, and managerial opportunism are the factors determining whether firm managers value their longlived assets at fair value or historical cost. This result implies that managers’ choices of valuation methods are in line with the aim of accounting standards after the IFRS adoption.