經理人薪酬與績效間都是呈現正相關嗎？內部董事及總經理權力之調節效果

Is the Manager Pay Performance Relationship Always Positive? The Role of Inside Director and CEO Power

過去文獻對於經理人薪酬與公司績效間的關聯性並沒有一致的結論，因此本文以臺灣2010年至2013年的上市櫃公司為研究樣本探討前述議題。除此之外，文獻也指出調節變數會影響薪酬、績效間的關聯性，因此本文進一步探討內部董事及總經理權力對於經理人薪酬與績效間關聯性的調節效果。本研究發現公司績效和經理人薪酬間呈現正相關，與代理理論觀點一致。除此之外，內部董事在薪酬委員會中的比重對於公司績效和經理人薪酬的關聯性有正向影響。然而，本研究並沒有發現總經理權力對於公司績效和經理人薪酬的關聯性具有負向影響。本文實證結果可以作為公司設計薪酬制度及政府制定公司治理法規時參考之用。

There is no consensus on the relationship between manager remuneration and company performance in the previous literature, so this study uses Taiwanese listed companies from 2010 to 2013 as samples to examine this issue. In addition, previous studies indicate that moderator variables may play a role in the pay performance relationship; therefore I further examine the role of the proportion of inside directors serving on the remuneration committee and CEO power in the relation between manager remuneration and company performance. The findings show that company performance is positively associated with manager remuneration, consistent with agency theory. In addition, the proportion of inside directors serving on the remuneration committee is positively related to the impact of company performance on manager compensation. However, I did not find that CEO power is negatively related to the impact of company performance on manager compensation. The results of this study have implications with regard to designing compensation contracts and regulating corporate governance mechanisms.