銷管費用僵固性、帝國建立動機與公司治理個別機制之成效

SGA Cost Stickiness, Empire-Building Incentives, and the Effects of Individual Corporate Governance Mechanisms

本研究以2005年至2012年台灣上市櫃公司的公司年資料為樣本驗證Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012)帝國建立動機是銷管費用僵固性成因之發現，並進一步探討公司治理個別機制是哪些帝國建立動機所造成僵固性的抑制對策。本研究發現以自由現金流量、總經理任期、總經理離職前、與總經理變動薪酬比率四個變數衡量的帝國建立動機，都會造成銷管費用僵固性。本研究也發現，法人持股比率越高、董事會規模越小、獨立董事比率越大、與總經理兼任董事長，各分別越能抑制一至三項帝國建立動機造成之僵固性，而且台灣公司治理個別機制的整體設計有「所有帝國建立動機所造成的僵固性都能抑制」與「每一個別機制都是有效的，且不會負向增強僵固性」的良好特質。

This paper uses a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the 2005-2012 period to examine whether the stickiness of selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA costs) can be attributed to the empire building incentives of managers, as hypothesized by Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012). This paper also explores whether individual corporate governance mechanisms can help alleviate SGA cost stickiness caused by the empire building incentives. I adopt free cash flow, CEO's tenure, CEO's short horizon, and CEO's variable pay ratio as proxies for empire building incentives. The results provide evidence to support the Chen et al.(2012)'s hypothesis. Moreover, the adoption of individual corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., higher institutional ownership ratio, smaller board size, higher ratio of outside directors, and CEO's duality) help alleviate cost stickiness imposed by some (one to three) empire building incentives. Furthormore, the empirical evidence indicates that the corporate governance mechanisms of firms in Taiwan's tend to forestall all incentives to empire building. In addition, each of the mechanisms helps to alleviate some of these incentive problems, without imposing adverse side-effects.