道德感情與動機：康德、席勒與牟宗三

Moral Feeling and Motive: Kant, Schiller and Mou Zongsan

根據廣為接受的主張，牟宗三 (1909-1995) 的道德哲學與康德 (Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804) 不同之處，在於前者不接受後者所堅持的理性與感性的二分，並且和牟宗三一樣，席勒 (Friedrich Schiller, 1759-1805) 在道德感情中見到道德主體自我實現的動力。相對於此，本文嘗試論證：一方面，席勒並不把感情視為道德行為的動力，另一方面，牟宗三對康德的批判，事實上植基於與康德十分不同的有關道德行動的觀點。

It is widely accepted that Mou Zongsan 牟宗三’s moral philosophy differs from Kant’s in that the former does not accept the dichotomy of rationality and sensibility made by the latter. It is moreover often claimed that both Schiller and Mou see in the moral subject’s moral feelings the power for his self-actualization. In contrast to these positions, I argue in this paper, first, that Schiller does not regard feelings to be the moving power behind moral acts, and second, that Mou’s criticism of Kant actually is rooted in an idea of moral action that is radically different from Kant’s.