人我間道德同感的參照起點－－孔子的「己」與亞當斯密的旁觀者

The Reference Point for Sympathy as the Foundation of Morality: The “Self” of Confucius and the “Spectator” of Adam Smith

孔子 (551-479 BC) 的仁論和亞當斯密 (Adam Smith, 1723-1790) 的道德情感論都建基於人類的關愛，而關愛則以人我之間具有道德面向的同感 (sympathy) 為前提，至於向什麼趨「同」，則必然要有一參照的起點。就此，孔子提出的是「己」，亞當斯密則為「旁觀者」。孔子的「己」失諸含混，其中隱含不少沒清楚界定的條件；而亞當斯密「旁觀者」的提法則是要強調與一己利害無涉，雖然清晰，但卻忽略了人在現實利害之外的道德訴求，而此訴求卻是源於內在良知的，對此亞當斯密又稱之為「內在之人」，結果令其參照點既是「旁觀者」又是「內在之人」，字面上顯得自相矛盾，反不如孔子之「己」的整全統一。

Both Confucius’ theory of ren and Adam Smith’s notion of “moral sentiments” are rooted in human love, which presumes the interpersonal presence of human “sympathy;” and in turn “sympathy” requires a reference point with which one’s sentiments (“-pathy”) are identified (“syn-”). With regards to this reference point, Confucius proposes a “self” while Adam Smith puts forward a “spectator.” The “self” of Confucius is somewhat vague and includes many hidden specifications, whereas Adam Smith’s “spectator” is formulated to stress that no considerations of material benefit are involved in the expression of sympathy. However, Smith’s concept fails to account for ethical considerations originating from one’s innermost conscience. To address these, Adam Smith has to coin another expression— “the man within” — which appears to contradict his notion of “spectator.” In comparison, Confucius’ conception of the “self” seems to be more integral and consistent.