以快感為名之激進／陳腐邪惡：以精神分析倫理學重讀鄂蘭

The Banality of Radical Evil in the Name of Enjoyment: Hannah Arendt Revisited through Ethics of Psychoanalysis

漢娜鄂蘭在其政治與道德理論中一直都關注著邪惡的問題，她所提出的極權體制中的「激進邪惡」與「惡之陳腐」的概念，引發諸多關於道德思考、判斷與責任的論爭。本文透過拉崗精神分析倫理學與紀傑克意識形態批判理論，闡述看似矛盾的「激進邪惡」與「惡之陳腐」兩個概念之間的同一性。本文所援引的政治與道德分析理論架構特別重視慾望、幻想與快感，觀照超我、道德與邪惡之間錯綜複雜的關聯。文末將論證「以快感為名之激進／陳腐邪惡」何以在極權體制之後繼續在當前時代中陰魂不散。

Hannah Arendt is always preoccupied with the problem of evil in her political and moral theory. Her conceptualizations of the “radical evil” and “banality of evil” in totalitarian regimes, however, provoke a great amount of controversies over moral thinking, judgment and responsibility. In light of Lacanian psychoanalytic ethics and Žižekian ideology critique, this essay will elucidate the conceptual consistency of “radical evil” and “banality of evil”: hence, “the banality of radical evil.” Such a theoretical framework of political and moral analysis is grounded in the centrality of desire, fantasy and enjoyment, and places much weight on the entanglement of the superego with morality as well as evil. The final part of this essay will explore how “the banality of radical evil in the name of enjoyment” outlives totalitarian regimes and continues to haunt us today.