Join the Pary but Don't Ruin it: Analysis of Pros and Cons of Hedge Fund Regulations

本文旨在提出,縱使避險基金產業有許多疏漏,由於現存的監管機制已能解決市場問題,避險基金的註冊制度仍過於極端而不可採。本文的第一部分認為,避險基金的註冊一來未解決詐欺問題,二來也並未擴充美國證劵交易委員會的管制權限,並非適切的因應之道。避險基金的註冊可能給予證劵交易委員會與內部參與者同等的資訊,但是正確的資訊也能經由其他管道獲致。本文的第二部分指出,避險基金的註冊並不能信靠,避險基金商品需求更多監管機制。最後,本文提出三種替代註冊的方式。政府不可自外於避險基金的管制,因為避險基金早已不再是菁英遊戲,退休撫卹及慈善基金也可能涉入其中,使得你我皆可能是受益者。本文強調,政府應該也被期待加入避險基金的遊戲機制,但宜謹慎以防破壞遊戲規則。

This paper seeks to demonstrate that although numerous flaws exist in the hedge fund industry, a registration requirement is too drastic an approach because alternative regulatory oversight is readily available to resolve the problems. The first part of the paper argues that registration is not an appropriate response because registration neither solves the fraud problem in hedge funds nor provides the SEC more extensive reach of its jurisdictional power. Granted, it may provide information to the SEC as to what participants are currently in the industry, but such information can be easily obtained from other existing schemes with little worries about its falsity. The second part of this paper argues that despite the fact that registration is an unwarranted step, more regulatory oversight is still needed to address concerns in the hedge fund industry. Finally, this paper concludes with three alternatives to address the SEC worries, demonstrating that the problems can be dealt with in ways other than compelling all funds to file standardized registration forms. It is difficult to keep the government away from the hedge fund parties anymore; after all, few hedge funds today are working exclusively for the elite individuals alone, they also invite pension funds and charities, which include you and me as one of the few thousand beneficiaries. The paper demonstrates that the government should and is welcomed to join the party, but just not ruin it.