Minority Controlling Shareholders: An Analytical Framework and Its Application to Taiwan

少數控股股東:分析模型的建立及對台灣的適用

控股股東結構在歐洲及東亞都很盛行,惟此涉及控股股東的代理成本,如有濫用或管理失當會影響公司的發展,如無適當管制則可能會使投資的意願低落,甚而影響成資本市場的低度發展。經驗研究已顯示台灣也遭受控制權與資金權過度分離所形成的控股股東結構的問題,此一問題也出現在許多東亞國家。台灣公司法繼受包括美國、德國與日本等國家的影響,加上持續的公司改革,使台灣的公司法可以同步於其他東亞國家的發展,並保有自我的獨特性。此一特質可供我們作進一步觀察與分析的模型。本文首先針對控股股東提出一個分析模型。第二部分則呈現台灣的現狀,乃是有少數控股股東結構與股東保護不足特徵的國家。第三部分尋求一個新的途徑以解決強制所有權過度集中的問題。第四部分則是從本文先前的分析架構討論進一步的管制途徑。第五部分則是結論。

Controlling shareholder structures are prevalent in both Europe and East Asia, and entail agency costs of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. This not only impacts the company through expropriation and mismanagement; such unfettered expropriation could lead to disinclination to invest and result in poorly developed capital markets. Empirical studies have shown that Taiwan also suffers from controlling shareholder structures accompanied by a sharp separation of control and cash-flow rights (controlling minority structure") that characterize much of East Asia. The myriad of influences (including U.S., German and Japanese) to which Taiwanese corporate law is subject, coupled with an only gradual long-term perspective for corporate reform, causes Taiwanese corporate law to simultaneously display parallels with East Asian countries and its own distinctive features. This provides an interesting model for observation and analysis. This article first provides the analytical framework for controlling shareholders. Part III presents the current situation of Taiwan, a country characterized by controlling-minority shareholder structures and poor shareholder protection. It highlights the novel approach of Taiwanese law in seeking to deal with the issue by mandatory ownership concentration. Part IV seeks to discuss the avenues of regulation derived from our analytical framework. Part V concludes.