通往他者的記憶：保羅．奧斯特自傳《孤獨及其所創造的》中的生成主體

Memory of/to the Other: The Becoming of the Narrative Self in Paul Auster’s Invention of Solitude

記憶與主體的關係一直以來乃記憶研究中的重要課題。一般認為，主體透過回憶，再現與重組存於記憶中的過去經驗，藉以肯定自我主體的完整性，即主體擁有再現過去記憶的絕對能力。此種主體與記憶彼此間的再現關係，在自傳敘事體中尤為顯著。傳統中，自傳作者大多採主觀回憶（再現過去記憶）的方式，重新閱覽、反省並評價其一生經歷；同時讀者藉由閱讀其回憶了解自傳作者的一生。然而，記憶與主體間的主從再現關係已為柏格森與德勒茲的論述所推翻。兩者先後提出，記憶非屬主觀個人，而是過去經驗本體的存有存在；主體也並非先驗，而是經由每個當下回憶（記憶的現實化）累積聚合而成，並於時間流動中不斷生成。柏氏與德氏的論點顛覆主體再現記憶的論點，並促使讀者重新思考記憶、回憶與自傳主體三者間的關係。藉此，本文試圖分析閱讀保羅‧奧斯特的自傳《孤獨及其所創造的》中的自傳主體，如何在回憶過程中自笛卡爾式的封閉主體逐漸轉變為德勒茲式的游牧式的生成主體。

The relation between memory and the self is always the main concern in memory studies. Usually, it is believed that the self is able to summon up past experiences into the present through recollection. By recalling his memories, the self has an opportunity to examine and reflect on his life, and the self can maintain his integrity at the same time. Autobiography is one of the narrative forms that can best display the representational relationship between memory and the self. However, Bergson’s notion of “pure memory” and Deleuze’s insight of the subject as a “becoming” negate the representability of memory by the self. In fact, the self functions as a passage or a singular point through which memory is actualized into the present. Based on Bergson’s and Deleuze’s views, this paper aims to revisit Paul Auster’s first autobiography, The Invention of Solitude, to explore how the autobiographical self transforms from a cogitolike self into a nomadic/becoming self via recollection.