是阻力？還是助力？中國私營企業主政商關係與政治改革動能關聯之探討

Plus or Minus? An Analysis on Causal Links between Private Entrepreneur Owners' Government-Business Relations and the Impluse of Political Reform in China

隨著中國經改的深化發展，私營企業逐漸成為其經濟發展的重要力量，地方政府與私營企業主間的「政商關係」形成一種利益共同體網絡，此與企業家利益與地方官員政績升遷有關。私營企業主基於提高其經濟、社會與政治地位之需求，試圖透過制度性與非制度性的政治參與途徑發揮影響力，尤其是透過私營企業的政治行為策略來達成目標，即所謂的政商關係或政治關聯。本文初步結論認為：一、黨國體系傾向給予私營企業主經濟利益或甚至在政治上適度讓步，藉此交換私營企業主放棄原先較具改革性的政治權利或主張。同時，企業主與地方政府官員的非制度性或非正式接觸形成一種利益關係網絡，並對地方政策產生影響。二、私營企業主已成為黨國體系政治穩定政策及經濟改革政策的最大受益者，不僅不可能挑戰現存體制，甚至比其他社會群體更加維護此種共同利益關係體。三、新經濟菁英尚不致於選擇運用直接挑戰或衝撞方式改變政府部門的政策方向；而是採取軟性、或者比較腐敗的手段。短期內，中共黨政權力結構並不會發生被企業家顛覆的可能性，而政治改革者也無法完全寄望企業家扮演發揮促進政治民主化角色的作用。

As Chinese economic and political reforms deepening, private enterprises arise gradually as one of the main forces for economic development. The 'government-business relations' between local governments and private entrepreneur owners form a interest-sharing network, which is closely related to business interests and local officials' performance-based promotion. Private entrepreneur owners, for the purposes of elevating their economic, social and political status, try to apply influence through institutional and non-institutional political participation. Particularly through the strategies of corporate political activities to achieve the goals, namely the so-called government-business relations or political connections. This paper finds three preliminary conclusions. First, the political power tends to yield in terms of business interests and even political compromise to private entrepreneur owners in exchange that business owners give up more progressive political appeals. In the meantime, business owners and local officials, through non-institutional and non-formal contacts, form a interest-based network and inject influence on the output of local policy. Secondly, private business owners have become the largest beneficiaries due to party-state system stability and economic reform policy. This business group will not challenge existing system but protect the shared interests than any other groups. Thirdly, new business elites will not exercise direct means to challenge or confront for the purpose of changing direction of government policy. They would rather adopt a soft or corrupt means instead. In the short run, Chinese communist political structure will not be subverted by entrepreneurs. Reformers can not vest their hope on entrepreneurs to play the role of advancing political democratization.