R&D Cost Allocation and Income Sharing for Industry-University Cooperation in Open Innovation Context

Open innovation is one of the effective modes to promote the transfer of universities research result of intellectual property into the enterprises demand side of intellectual property. Solving the cooperation mechanism and income distribution problems of demander and provider of intellectual property is the key to guarantee long-term steady development of open intellectual property innovation. This paper studies the cooperation mechanism problems of university and enterprise based on game theory with income distribution model as analysis thought. The study result shows: the demander of intellectual property promises to higher Transfer payment proportion to provider of intellectual property in contract form, which can increase the overall return of open innovation; university and enterprise should prefer collaborative innovation, because the intellectual property rights innovation scale of the demander and provider of intellectual property when carrying out cooperative game is greater than that when carrying out non-cooperative game; reasonable distribution can be carried out for excess earnings produced from cooperation innovation based on Rubinstein subgame perfect equilibrium result.