結合管制：效率與公平間之取捨

Merger Regulations: A Trade-off between Efficiency and Equity

依據Williamson理論：結合所產生的綜效必然大於其限制競爭的無謂損失。因此，所有結合案的整體經濟利益都會超過限制競爭的不利益，從而有利於經濟效率提升。即使結合可能導致獨占力提升與價格上漲，減損消費者福利，甚至形成所得分配不公，但只要公平會按照公平法第13條規定，僅考慮「經濟效率」，但忽視「政治公平」，就應當核准所有的結合申請案件，競爭法對於結合的規範也就形同虛設。因此，本文援引新制度經濟學的主張與各國反托拉斯潮流，建議：反托拉斯政策不僅要解決市場失靈的經濟效率問題，更要顧及潛在的政治公平問題（例如：貧富差距），必須經濟與政治並重，求取公平與效率間的平衡。

Williamson proposes that the synergies arising from a merger are mostly larger than its deadweight losses. This implies that the economic benefits from a merger would outweigh its disadvantages from competition restraint. Hence, most of the merger cases could promote economic efficiency. If, pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Fair Trade Law, the TFTC considers only economic efficiency but not political equity, then Williamson's theory implies that a merger should not be prohibited by the law even though market power is created, consumers are hurt by price hikes, and poverty gap is further widened. Based on this, this article uses the perspective of New Institutionalism and global trend of law enforcement to show that the antitrust has to address both market failures and political issues (such as wealth concentration). Only from both economic and political considerations can antitrust achieve a balance between efficiency and equity.