CEO聲譽會影響財務報導品質嗎？

Does CEO Reputation Matter to Financial Reporting Quality?

資本市場參與者仰賴財務資訊進行重要決策，而高品質的財務報表提供可信及有用的資訊，更能反映企業的經濟實質。本文以2006－2008間303家台灣電子業之現任CEO為樣本，檢視CEO聲譽是否會影響企業之盈餘報導品質。效率契約假說預期CEO因聲譽考量會採取效率報導行為，故其盈餘品質較高；但管理投機行為假說則認為高聲譽CEO會因投機目的進行盈餘裁量，故其盈餘品質較低。實證結果顯示，CEO聲譽效果確實會影響企業之財務報導決策，且當CEO聲譽愈高時，企業之盈餘品質愈佳，支持效率契約假說。此外，CEO之聲譽效果在家族企業中仍然存在，支持利益一致之觀點。本研究以所有權高度集中及家族企業林立之國家為樣本，隱含CEO聲譽－盈餘品質之關係需考量機構背景不同而下定論。

Financial reporting credibility is important because decision-useful information is greatly appreciated by all market participants. From a sample of 303 incumbent CEOs from Taiwanese listed electronics firms during the period from 2006-2008, the present study explores to what extent CEO reputation affects a firm's earnings quality. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts reputed CEOs produce higher quality financial reports while the managerial opportunism hypothesis posits the opposite. Empirical findings indicate that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates in explaining such relationships. Moreover, the positive CEO reputation effects persist in family firms because of their strong incentive to protect the longevity and reputation of the family, supporting the alignment of interest argument. Overall, our results provide additional evidence on variations in CEO reputation-earnings quality relationships using an international setting with distinctive features related to concentrated ownership and the abundance of family firms.