美國Microsoft案後續發展及其對計算標準專利合理權利金之影響

The Aftermath of the Microsoft Case and Its Reach on the Calculation of Reasonable Royalty of Standard Patent in the United States

近年來，標準專利權人利用其市場優勢地位，企圖以專利訴訟威脅使用人，向使用人提出禁制令，並藉以索取不合理授權金等問題，受到美國聯邦法院重視。2013年美國西雅圖聯邦地方法院，首度在Microsoft v. Motorola乙案中判定標準專利權人提出高額權利金行為，已構成違反其與標準專利組織間，以合理不歧視（RAND)條件授權技術使用人之義務。判決中分析RAND承諾之功能、RAND承諾之契約義務、建立RAND條件之權利金比率之計算機制對於RAND承諾之法理與標準專利權利金理論之建置具有重大意義。同年11月在In re Innovatio IP，美國聯邦地方法院再度重申並補充及修正Microsoft案所建置RAND承諾之功能、RAND承諾之契約義務、建立RAND條件之權利金比率之計算機制，使得Microsoft案所建立RAND承諾與標準專利權利金之相關理論更加完整。2015年2月國際電機標準協會修正智慧財產權政策，並對於RAND權利金比例作出定義，其文字更引用Microsoft與Innovatio二個判決對於RAND權利金之見解，預期Microsoft案所架構的理論，其影響層面將更為深遠。本文將以Microsoft與Innovatio判決為研究中心，討論二案RAND承諾之功能、RAND承諾之契約義務、如何建立RAND條件之權利金比率之計算機制，並討論此二案件所產生之後續問題與其他法院對於Microsoft案所架構理論延伸之討論，以期建立適當RAND條件之權利金之計算理論，平衡標準專利人與使用人之權利，使標準設定之功能得以彰顯。

Recently the United States federal court refocused and paid high attention to the issue of request of unreasonable royalty by patentees of standard essential patents to whom were under the threat of patent litigations and injunctive relief. In 2013, in the case of Microsoft v. Motorola, the court held that Motorola, as patentee of standard patents, breached its obligation of reasonable and non-discriminatory commitments to standard setting organization by requesting unreasonably royalty from Microsoft, the user of standard patents. In the dictum of the case, the court analyzed the function and obligation of RAND licensing. Even more significantly, the court set the framework and the methods of calculating RAND rate for standard patent in this case. In November of 2013, the Court once again stated in the In re Innovatio IP case, with slight modification, the theory of RAND framework formulated in the case of Microsoft. This modification/amendment, indeed, filled the gap that was left unaddressed in the case of Microsoft and complemented the framework of the theory of RAND and its impacts on the royalty rate estimation. As a result of the ruling and policies set out in these cases, the IEEE, a standard setting organization, amended its intellectual property policy in 2015. The most notablechange the IEEE made to its policy was that the definition of reasonable royalty is incorporate in the policy. This definition basically drew from the wording and opinions of the aforementioned cases. Therefore, the theory established by these two cases, predictably, had and will continue to have, profound effects on the standard patent litigation cases. This paper discusses the case of Microsoft and Innovatio and shed some light on the function of RAND commitment, the contractual obligations under RAND commitment and the framework of RAND royalty rate. It aims to be exegesis on this topical legal issue and critically appraises the RAND’s royalty rates with the intention of balancing the interests of the parties-patentee and standard users.