經理人持股與股利政策─論經理人過度自信之角色

Management Ownership and Dividend Policy: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence

本研究主要探討台灣上市櫃公司，經理人持股與股利政策間關係是否受到經理人過度自信影響。實證結果顯示，經理人持股與股利支付之間呈現非單調線性關係。重要的是，經理人過度自信影響經理人持股與股利政策之間的非單調線性關係。縱使經理人持股足以有效控制公司，並藉由調降股利而掠奪股東利益，然而過度自信經理人因高估公司未來的現金流入及展望，調降股利的意圖相對低於非過度自信者，故股利調降幅度相對較小。此外持股偏高下，經理人透過高額股利以降低投資過度集中的風險，但過度自信經理人高估個人能力、公司投資計畫的價值，甚至低估投資風險，選擇保留公司盈餘以應付公司未來的資金需求。故股利支付隨著持股增加的幅度，相對低於非過度自信經理人。最後本研究證實經理人過度自信能夠減緩因經理人地位鞏固所造成股利調降的利益掠奪效果。

This paper examines whether the relationship between management ownership and dividend policies is subject to the influence of managerial overconfidence among listed companies in Taiwan. The empirical study suggests a non-linear relationship between management ownership and dividend payouts. Most importantly, this study finds that managerial overconfidence affects the nonmonotonic linear relationship between management ownership and dividend payout policies. Even when management ownership is sufficient to effectively control the company and managers seek to expropriate the shareholders’ interests by reducing payouts, overconfident managers will have a weaker intention to reduce payouts than non-overconfident managers because overconfident managers overestimate future cash flows and prospects. Whilst managers may resort to high payouts to reduce the risk of wealth concentration due to high management ownership, overconfident managers will overestimate their personal capabilities and project values or even underestimate investment risks. As a result, they choose to retain earnings to meet future capital needs. The rate with which payouts increase along with ownership is lower for overconfident managers than for nonoverconfident managers. Finally, this paper shows that managerial overconfidence lessens the entrenchment effects due to the strengthened position of managers and the resulting payout reductions.