英文摘要 |
The Taiwan central government’s agency performance assessment system, which follows the United States’ GPRA rationale and has been carried out for more than a decade, was recently criticized by the media as ineffective as having become ritualized. More specifically, it was indicated that the assessment system has produced managerial dysfunctions and the so-called performance paradox phenomenon. With four focus-group interviews which covered participants from one-third of the ministries at the cabinet level, this study aims at exploring the root causes of the performance paradox phenomenon through theoretical angles. The findings show that the agency performance assessment system cannot fully reflect governmental employees’ daily efforts and does not offer incentive rewards, as public employees confront multiple and competing evaluation systems in the field. This situation forces employees to decouple the agency performance assessment system from the team-based performance evaluation system which is tightly associated with individual employee’s appraisal results. Decoupling the external agency performance assessment system from the internal team-based performance evaluation system could be understood as a strategic response toward the pressure derived from multiple institutional logics in a given organization. Moreover, considering these performance measurement systems as different institutional or mental accounts and responding to them in a differentiated way is definitely in line with the underlying argument of mental accounting. |