誰是搭便車者？以霸權穩定論檢證中美外援對跨國直接投資政治風險的影響

Who Is the Free Rider? An Application of the Hegemonic Stability Theory to Test the Impacts of China’s and the United States’ Foreign Aid on the Political Risks of Outward Foreign Direct Investment

本文利用霸權穩定理論，檢證與比較中美兩國外援對跨國直接投資的影響。研究方法為結構方程式，研究對象為2000-2013年145 個開發中國家與轉型國家。實證結果顯示：中美兩國外援都可充當國際投資公共財─降低跨國直接投資政治風險，且雙方都在搭對方的便車。具體而言，本文發現有六：第一，政治風險阻礙跨國直接投資，中資企業也不例外；這是過去文獻忽略之處。第二，中美兩國外援都有利於跨國直接投資。第三，排除政治改革的中國大陸外援，其對跨國直接投資的貢獻，明顯低於美國外援。第四，中國大陸外援旨在，為其企業走出去鋪路。第五，美國外援側重其國家安全。換言之，中美兩國提供國際公共財，都有其自利動機。最後，中美兩國跨國直接投資，都受惠於對方的外援；差別在於，中美雙方受惠程度不同而已。總體而言，霸權穩定理論對現今國際政經體系，具有高度的解釋力。唯本文的實證結果，可從三方面補充霸權穩定理論。第一，國際公共財的供給，並非霸權國專有權力；維繫國際政經秩序的意願，才是居中關鍵。第二，國際公共財的供給國，沒有意識型態限制，只要恪守市場經濟規範、不傷害受援國的治理品質亦可。第三，霸權國提供國際公共財，都不是純利他考量；反之皆為政治精算的結果。

We adopted the hegemonic stability theory to test the impacts of China’s and the United States’ foreign aid on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Method of the structural equation modeling was applied to examine 145 developing countries, 2000-2013. The empirical results show both China’s and the United States’ foreign aid acted as international public goods to reduce the political risks in international investment and both simultaneously get a free ride from each other. This paper has six findings: First, political risk hinders OFDI, and Chinese companies are no exception; this was ignored by previous literature. Second, these two countries’ foreign aids are conducive to OFDI. Third, China’s foreign aid does not require political reform of the host countries, thus, its contribution to OFDI was significantly lower than the United States’ foreign aid. Fourth, the Chinese foreign aid was intended to pave the way for their enterprises to ＂go out＂. Fifth, the United States’ foreign aid is focused on its national security. These two countries both provided international public goods, and have motives of serving their own interests. Finally, the OFDI of these two countries is benefited from each side’s foreign aid; the difference is only of degree. Overall, the hegemonic stability theory has high explanatory power for the current international political and economic system. The empirical results of this paper compensate the hegemonic stability theory in three aspects. First, a supply of international public goods is not the prerogative of the hegemonic nation; the will of maintaining international order is the key. Second, a supply of international public goods by a country is not based on ideology, as long as the norms of a market economy are abided by and the quality of governance in the recipient countries is not harmed. Third, the hegemonic nation providing international public goods does not have altruistic considerations; it follows well political calculations.