哈伯瑪斯法律哲學的轉折發展及其體系中道德與法律之關係的適切性

On the Turn in the Development of the Legal Philosophy of Jürgen Habermas and the Adequency for the Relationship between Moral and Law

本文欲探討哈伯瑪斯（Jürgen Habermas）法律哲學之發展過程、發展過程中體系和諧性的維持、以及他對「道德與法律之關係」的界定是否合宜。文中將指出由1982到1986年這第一階段，他認為道德規範難以憑自身之力推動人們實際遵守，因此需要藉助法律來彌補道德規範推動力的不足；但是法律仍須透過道德的「論辯」來取得其內容上之正當性，因此兩者具有「互補」關係。但後來受到「社群主義」（Communitarianism）及魯曼（Niklas Luhmann）的挑戰，由1988至1992年，他承認法律議題之考量不止是「道德」而已，而且法律也僅須取得特定法律共同體的同意即可，而非必須取得一切有理性者之同意，因此他提出一種「論辯三分說」。此一思想之轉變，不僅引發了其前後期法律思想是否能保持一貫的問題，而且也使得他對道德與法律的關係之界定的適切性，成為可議之點。

This paper tries to investigate the development of the legal philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, the consistency of his doctrine, and the adequency for his description of the relationship between moral and law. The research will point out that in the first phase, i.s. from 1982 to 1986, Habermas means that moral alone cannot sufficiently motivate the people to obey its norms. Therefore, moral needs law to improve this defect. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of law ought to be based on the consequences of the ＂moral discourse＂. In other words, moral and law stand in a complementary relationship. But later on, due to the critiques coming from the ＂Communitarianism＂ and Niklas Luhmann, Habermas admits that legal consideration shall not be confined to moral alone. Besides, law could aquire its full legitimacy from the agreement of all members of this legal community instead of from the consent of all human beings. Consequently Habermas holds a theory of the ＂trichotomy of the reason＂. This ＂turn＂ not only has caused the problem about the consistency of the legal philosophy of Habermas, but also made his understanding of the relationship between moral and law a controversial point.