保險法中倒霉的好事之徒－－駁可保利益要求

Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case against the Insurable Interest Requirement

幾個世紀以來，法律一直都禁止人們為陌生人的生命或財產購買保險，因為這種保險合同將會誘使投保人為了獲得保險金而非法終止他人生命或毀壞他人財產。因此，法律要求投保人對於其投保的個人或財產享有“可保利益”，缺少“可保利益”的保險合同會被法院以違反公共政策為由判定無效。文章將對可保利益要求進行經濟分析，並且認為這一原則產生了一種負面的誘因從而導致可保利益原則不能依其原來的目的發揮作用。除了這一原則本身固有的問題外，此原則還導致保險市場的不公平和低效率。文章通過分析得出結論：法院禁止個體對陌生人的生命或財產訂立保險合同的最好方式就是儘量避免一開始就將此類合同判定無效。

For centuries, the law has prevented people from purchasing insurance on the life or property of strangers because such insurance contracts would give policyholders incentives to end the life or destroy the property in order to collect the insurance payout. The law thus requires that policyholders have an “insurable interest” in the person or property they insure, and contracts lacking such an “insurable interest” are invalidated by courts as against public policy. This note presents an economic analysis of the insurable interest requirement, and argues that the doctrine creates perverse incentives that encourage the very practices the doctrine seeks to deter. In addition to failing on its own terms, the doctrine also invites unfairness and inefficiency in the insurance market. This note concludes that the best way for courts to prevent insurance contracts on the life or property of strangers may be to refrain from invalidating such contracts in the first place.