法律經濟學中財產權怎麼了？

文章追溯了作為一種特別的對物權的財產權概念在英美法理論中的衰亡，以及財產權只是特定資源的一系列利用權的集合的觀點在現代法律經濟學中的興起。文章的第一部分，指出了財產權的對物維度在學術討論中消失的事實。文章的第二部分，回顧了財產權的傳統概念以及法律現實主義者對於財產權是一個“權利束”的另一種解釋的鼓吹。在這個基礎上，第三部分重新審視了科斯的經典論文，力求揭示所暗含的支撐其理論的財產權概念，認為科斯採納了法律現實主義者偏愛的“權利束”財產權概念的一個極端版本。隨後的第四部分，選擇性地評述了後科斯主義法律經濟學者對財產權的各種論述，發現“使用的序列”的概念貫穿於始終。第五部分，簡要地考察了承認財產權的對物維度能夠有助於法律經濟學者更好地解釋財產權問題的幾個方面。第六部分總結全文。

This Essay traces the decline of the conception of property as a distinctive in rem right in Anglo-American thought, and the rise of the view among modern legal economists that property is simply a list of use rights in particular resources. The authors begin, in Part I, with an introduction of the fact that the in rem aspect of property has largely disappeared from academic discourse. Part II takes a brief overview of the traditional conception of property and the legal realists’advocacy of the alternative“bundle of rights” conception. Once the stage is set, Part III turns to Coase’s work, in an effort to uncover the implicit conception of property rights that animates his theory. The authors conclude that Coase adopts an extreme Version of the bundle-ofrights conception of property favored by the legal realists. This is followed, in Part IV, by a selective review of post-Coasean treatments of property in law and economics scholarship, where the authors find the list-of-uses conception carried forward in a variety of guises. In Part V, the authors briefly consider some areas in which an explicit recognition of the in rem dimension of property would enrich the understanding of property issues by law and economics scholars. Part VI concludes.