董監事責任險與公司信用評分

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Credit Score

本文利用2008 至2012 年台灣上市公司的資料，檢驗公司投保董監事與重要幹部責任險(Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, DOLI)與信用評分間的關聯性。董監事責任險在國外已存在多年，而近年來在台灣隨著保險市場逐漸開放，以及金融市場上董監事與管理階層面臨的訴訟風險日益增加，公司為降低其風險並留任優秀人才願意勝任公司重要職位，為他們投保董監事責任險的案例逐年增加。理論上董監事責任險的利益是讓管理階層及董事會成員願意承擔適當的風險，以避免他們在風險趨避下導致企業投資不足而產生公司價值損失；然而，其成本則包括因管理階層或董監事有了責任險而使公司承擔過高的風險以及董監事輕忽管理監督職責等。本文檢驗公司投保DOLI 如何影響公司的風險承擔程度，又會對公司的信用評分產生何種影響，以評估公司投保的利益是否大於其成本。本文衡量公司投保董監事責任險有兩種方式：1.投保金額以及2.有無投保的事實。風險承擔以公司股價報酬率的標準差、資產報酬率的標準差以及槓桿比率來衡量。信用評分則以臺灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)所建構的企業信用風險指標(Taiwan CorporateCredit Risk Index, TCRI)來做為代理變數。本文主要的實證方法是以序列機率模型(Ordered ProbitModel)進行迴歸之估計，實證結果顯示，投保的公司其信用評分是顯著相對較佳的，而投保的金額亦與公司信用評分呈顯著正相關聯，表示只要公司投保董監事或投保金額愈高，公司的信用風險是相對較低的。

Empirical studies on the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (DOLI) and firm’s operating consequence are well-documented, yet the focus of firm’s risk is less discussed as the financial tsunami affecting firm’s operating risk a lot. Directors and officers that are covered by DOLI tend to have lower litigation risk and encouraged to take appropriate risk and thus reduce value loss from underinvestment. However, as they are protected by DOLI, moral hazard emerged as they have tendency to take higher risk and their effort on managerial monitoring may be overlooked as well. Based on the data of Taiwan-Stock Exchange-listed companies covering the period 2008~2012, this paper examines how firm with DOLI/greater DOLI coverage has influence on firm’s degree of risk taking and credit score. Empirical result from Probit estimation indicated that firm with DOLI as well as higher DOLI coverage tends to have favorable credit score. Principal outcomes changed little after controlling self-selection of firm’s demanding DOLI.