伊藤仁齋詮釋《中庸》之盲點

Blind Spots in Itô Jinsai's Account of the ＂Zhongyong (Chûyô)＂

德川時代的古典儒學者伊藤仁齋，為儒家經典《中庸》所作的註釋書《中庸發揮》，檢視了原典中的術語在古文中的用途，企圖恢復這些術語的「古義」。數百年前，朱熹詮釋《中庸》的《中庸章句》，提出一些形上學術語，伊藤大力修訂朱熹的形上學術語，認定朱熹「靜態抽象」的理　學對「動態真實」的存在沒有任何影響，也不能當作人生實踐的方針？相反地，他試圖證明原始的《中庸》不但實際，對人類倫常關係的行為也有影響。伊藤仁齋的立場帶有地域色彩，也反映出日本對朱熹術語的理解，他們認為朱熹的重要概念（例如「理」）是呆板而造作的。伊藤質疑朱熹體系的一貫性和重要性，並發展出對人類價值觀的「常識論陳述」，以符合實際社會的形構。儘管有這樣的背景，伊藤仁齋在《中庸發揮》的論證，完全是根據他對文本的古典派分析，因此我們可以直接檢視他的論證。本文認為伊藤過度修正朱熹和宋朝儒學對中庸的形上學詮釋，因此在概念上沒有足夠的基礎，來支持他在自己在解讀《中庸》時企圖注入的孟子觀念。他大膽解構朱熹的架構，而且只認知到日常生活具體的現實和經驗，卻悄悄注入孟子的觀念。《中庸》所代表的傳統比孟子更早，孟子企圖把這個傳統發揚光大，而非取而代之，顯示伊藤的作法只是白費力氣。本文在結論指出，伊藤仁齋是透過本身的文化和年代的角度來詮釋《中庸》，他對原典術語的詮釋，和古典及南宋時代的中國截然不同。此外，他認為《中庸》指的是一般適當行為的典範，而非中國原本的「不偏不倚」的意思。儘管伊藤的陳述和中國儒學有所差異，他確實恢復了原典當中的某些人文主義精神。伊藤運用他古典主義的方法，一開始的作法是正確的，可惜他的盲點讓我們無法得知正宗儒學的目標。

Itô Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 (1627-1705), a Tokugawa Confucian classicist, seeks to restore the ＂ancient meanings＂ of the original key terms in his commentary on the Confucian classic Zhongyong, Chûyô hakki 中庸發揮 (Elucidation of the ZY), by examining their uses in the ancient text. He forcefully ＂brackets＂ the metaphysical terms Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) had introduced in interpreting the text centuries earlier in Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句 (ZY, in chapter and verse), denying that Zhu's ＂static abstract＂ philosophy of li/ri 理 (pattern, principle) has implications for ＂dynamic actual＂ existence or can guide human life practice. He seeks to show that, on the contrary, the original ZY is practical and has implications for the conduct of ethical human relations. Jinsai's stance has local color and reflects Japanese understandings of Zhu's terminology, which viewed Zhu's key concepts, such as li/ri (pattern, principle), as wooden and artificial. Jinsai questions the coherence and relevance of Zhu's system, and develops a ＂common-sensist account＂ of human values to suit the formation of an actual society. Despite this background, Jinsai's argument in Chûyô hakki is based strictly on his classicist analysis of the text, so we can examine his argument straightforwardly. The present study argues that Jinsai brackets too much of the Zhu Xi and Song Confucian metaphysical reading of the ZY, leaving him insufficient conceptual ballast to support Mencian notions he tries to inject into the ZY in his own reading. He boldly deconstructs Zhu's frame and only recognizes the hard reality and experience of everyday life, yet slipping Mencian notions in the backdoor. The futility of his approach is underscored by the fact that the ZY represents a tradition that antedates Mencius, one that Mencius tried to ramify if not replace. The paper concludes when Jinsai views the ZY through the looking glass of his own culture and era, he reads the terms in the text very differently than they were read in classical and Southern Song China. Moreover, he associates zhongyong more with the norms of proper common practice than with the original Chinese notion of ＂utmost propriety.＂ While his account is a departure from Chinese Confucianism, Jinsai does recovers some of the humanistic spirit in the original text. By using his classicist method, Jinsai sets off on the right path, but his blind spots prevent us toward the desired authentic Confucian destination.