內部董事超額薪酬和公司未來績效：隱性合約觀點之實證研究

Inside Director’s Excess Compensation and Firm’s Future Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Implicit Contract Perspective

本研究主旨在探討內部董事超額薪酬與公司未來績效的關連性。本研究定義內部董事之應領薪酬為「績效」、「複雜度」及「風險」所組成的函數，而實際薪酬減去應領薪酬則為超額薪酬，此外依據隱性合約，「超額薪酬」係指未能由本期可以公開觀察到的財務與市場績效指標所解釋的薪酬變異。本研究除了探討內部董事的總超額薪酬外，亦一併分析內部董事的董事身份超額薪酬及經理人身份超額薪酬。本研究實證結果顯示不論是以下一期 Tobin’s Q，或是下兩期 Tobin’s Q 作為未來績效指標，亦或是僅以非電子產業公司為研究樣本，內部董事的總超額薪酬及董事身份超額薪酬都和公司未來績效具顯著正相關性，支持隱性合約觀點。然而內部董事的經理人身份超額薪酬和公司未來績效則不具顯著正相關性。

This paper investigates the relationship between inside director’s excessive pay and the firm’s future performance. The excessive pay is derived by subtracting actual pay with reasonable pay. Our paper assumes that the firm’s outsiders would consider the reasonable pay as compensation for inside directors’ current observable performance measures in three dimensions: performance, complexity, and risk. The excessive pay represents the proportion of compensation unable to be explained by current observable performance measures. However, excessive pay may be due to implicit incentive contracts for unobservable performance measures that contribute to the firm’s future performance. Every inside director is rewarded with both of managerial pay and director’s pay. Our empirical results show that the excessive pay for the two roles and that only for the director’s role are significantly and positively associated with the Tobin’s Q from the following year, which supports the existence of implicit contracts. Nevertheless, excessive pay for inside directors’ managerial role lacks significant relations to the firm’s future Tobin’s Q as well as return on assets.