英文摘要 |
Both cash payouts to shareholders and financial reporting quality are results of careful corporate strategies. High-quality financial reporting supports fund-raising activities and facilitates firms to replenish cash paid to their shareholders. Firms that exercise accounting discretions to hide information from the market should avoid cash payouts in order to reduce the opportunities for the market to scrutinize over their financial reporting. These suggest a positive association between cash payouts to shareholders and financial reporting quality. Cash paid flexibly via share repurchases has additional impacts on earnings per share and should be less informative than cash dividends in terms of financial reporting quality. This study finds empirical results consistent with these predictions. In this study, dividend-paying firms have smoother income that is not adjusted by discretionary accruals than firms without cash payouts. Similar results are found when we compare firms buying back shares with nonpayers, but these two groups of firms do not have any significant difference in their reporting discretion. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, cash paid via share repurchases substitutes for discretionary accruals, consistent with its nature being an alternative way of real earnings management. The Act reduced reporting discretion by a smaller degree for dividend-paying firms than others whose low-quality of financial reporting is more sensitive to regulatory changes. These comparisons among the different responses to the Act provide robustness checks to our empirical results. |