英文摘要 |
Recently, there were quite a number of accounting scandals and financial fraudulence emerged within American stock markets that led to austere dubiousness about the true financial performance of the company. Unsuitable corporate governance system has been esteemed the root of the matter suffering the serious consequences on financial statement fraud instances. Corrupt morals of firm management provide lessons for Taiwan to stress the pivot of corporate governance. According to the stipulations of Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taiwan's computerized over-the-counter market (OTC) listing rules, every publicly held company should at least bring two independent directors and one independent supervisor into their boards after 2002. This study examines whether accounting choices are driven by opportunistic managers who exploit lax corporate governance system and the impact of family business group on the effectiveness of governing firm management. This paper finds that firms with family-controlled structure show a poor corporate governance system. However, with respect to lower family-controlled firms, researchers find that boards are more independent than their counterparts. Likewise, abnormal accruals decline when board size exceeds nine board members and when managerial stockholdings exceeds 25%. A negative relation is also found between foreign institutional shareholdings and abnormal accruals. Further investigation provides evidence that family-controlled firms are associated with weak board monitoring. |