身體感：胡塞爾對身體的形構分析

Corporeality: Husserl’s Constitutive Analysis of Body

胡塞爾在《觀念Ⅱ》與《笛卡兒沈思》對身體的形構分析與基源分析思想之間，我們可以讀出一條回歸身體具體存在的存在現象學或現象學心理學的描述之路，亦即透過身體感的基源存在條件，形構出「自我」與「他者」的「共同世界」。換言之，如果有所謂「身體意向性」的話，就身體知覺作用／知覺內容的兩重結構來說，身體感的知覺作用層面是實在的，隸屬心理領域的「事實知覺」(factual perceptions)，而身體感的知覺內容則形成「物質」、「自我」、「世界」、「他人」等非實在的「形相知覺」(eidos perceptions)－－也就是「想像」領域。本文運用形構式的「病理學還原」與「基源分析」的平行對比，來彰顯「身體感」的形構條件，「病理學還原」是由心理事實的領域出發，從存在層面去還原出身體的「本質結構」；而「基源分析」則是從主體際性的原初構成根源進行還原，去描述種種主體際「形相知覺」的構成過程。

Based upon Husserl’s constitutive analysis and genetic analysis of psychology. According to phenomenology of perception and corporeal intentionality which was later developed by Merleau-Ponty, a double-layer structure of the perception and the perceptible co-exists. The perception involves the experiential field of real and factual perceptions; while the perceptible involves the unreal field of eidos perceptions, which is also a field of primordial imagination about matter, self, world and other. With parallel application of pathological reduction and genetic analysis methods, this article presents the operation of phenomenological psychology on the constitution of body as well as the genetic phenomenon of “corporeality.”