從信息不對稱向決策瑕疵矯正的弱者保護路徑變遷－－基於對信息披露、撤回權與投資者適當性的考察

The Transition of Protection Path for Under-privileged Groups from Information Asymmetry to Decision-making Flaws Redress - Based on the Analysis on Information Disclosure, Revocation Rights and Investor Suitability

當遇多的信息披露造成愈來愈多的信息過載和知識超限時，信息的簡約化和通俗化亦無法慧助具有內在理性瑕疵的波決策者實現決策的優化，賦予決策者更多權利的撤回權和限制決策者自由的投資者適當性規則作為彌補信息披露功能邊界的制度開始被引入。

With intensive information disclosures just increasingly creating the problems of information overload and knowledge surpassing, the simplification and understandability of information disclosure can not help the actors with innate rational flaws to realize the decision optimization, as a result the institutions of revocation, which endows consumers with more rights, and suitability rule, which limits the investor's option, began to be introduced as the remedies to the functional limitations of information disclosure.