| 英文摘要 |
Sismondo proposes that deflationary pluralism about truth offers the possibility fora more comprehensive philosophy of science. I disagree. I hold that we either need to abandon deflationary approaches of philosophy of science or need to have deflationism without the conception of truth. I shall elaborate these two possibilities in this small article. In the articles “For realism, and anti-realism” (2007) and “Deflationary Metaphysics” (2014), Sismondo criticizes deflationary realisms as unstable. In doing so, he intends to show the value of some very down-to-earth metaphysical interpretations rejected by deflationary philosophy of science. Still, he expresses that he expects more of deflationism by saying that “while their starting points are good ones, deflationary approaches should help us to understand the sciences in simultaneously realist, instrumentalist, and constructivist terms.”. |
本站僅提供期刊文獻檢索。
