當代東亞倫理學的兩種主體概念——論和辻哲郎、唐君毅和牟宗三對哲學倫理學的進路

Two Concepts of the Subject in Modern East Asian Ethics: The Approach to Philosophical Ethics in Watsuji Tetsuro, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan

本文討論和辻哲郎、唐君毅和牟宗三位大哲學家的倫理學思想，目的為引起當代新儒家與京都學派之間的哲學對話。三位思想家皆主張哲學倫理學必須脫離西方認知論與存有論典範。因此，他們建立兩種主體概念的區分辨別，即和辻哲郎所講「主觀」與「主體」和新儒家所謂「道德主體」與「認識主體」的兩組概念。本文點出此概念不僅有類似的思想內涵，而且它們對西方哲學皆具有批判性的潛力。為了進一步深入三位哲學家的道德思想，筆者用比較的方式探討京都學派與新儒家哲學對人的觀念，著重和辻哲郎「自他不二」與「人間」的兩個觀點和牟宗三所提出的「人雖有限而可無限」說法。筆者承認，雙方概念各自有其特殊義含，但它們也有一個共同焦點，即皆想要發展出一種獨立於西方個體主義的思想模式，進行另類道德哲學探討。

The present essay inquires into the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro, Mou Zongsan, and Tang Junyi, thereby trying to initiate a dialogue between two important strands of modern East Asian philosophy, namely New Confucianism and the Kyoto School. The starting point is a commonly shared focus on the task at hand: All three philosophers discussed here think it imperative to emancipate philosophical ethics from the dominating paradigm of Western ontology and epistemology. To this end, they establish a categorical distinction between the moral subject and the epistemological subject – shutai and shukan in Watsuji, daode zhuti and renshi zhuti in New Confucianism – and try to base philosophical ethics exclusively on the former. This essay compares both sets of distinctions in order to work out their shared assumptions on man's moral nature as well the criticism they entail with regard to Western ethics. In a second step, the essay aims to explore the concept of man in which both approaches to moral philosophy are being grounded. Here, the focus is on Watsuji's concepts of ningen (human being-in-between) and jita fuji (non-duality of Self and Other) as well as Mou Zongsan's insistence on the possibility of human self-transcendence (ren sui you xian er ke wu xian). While cognizant of the subtle differences involved, the essay maintains that both thinkers seek to develop conceptual alternatives to what they perceive as the dominating modern Western self-image of man qua individual.