英文摘要 |
This paper is an investigation of the claim in Buddhism that 'mental action (”manaskarman”) is the most reprehensible for the performance of evil action.' There are five parts to the analysis: Firstly, I analyze the chapter in the ”agama” sutra where the claim first appears, so as to illuminate the basic view substantiating the claim that 'mental karma is the most significant (of the three karmas)'. Secondly, I analyze arguments for and against this claim given in the ”Satyasiddhiśāstra”, pointing out that the emphasis on 'mental karma' is to stress the 'mind as the root of everything.' All dharmas have mind as their basic premise onto which follows the formation of good or bad karma. Thirdly, I point out that the emphasis on 'mental karma' stems from the view that, unlike actions of body and speech, mental processes are karmic processes in themselves. This is illustrated by the close connection between ”manas”, ”cetana”, ”saṃskāra”, and karma. This does not however imply that actions of body and speech are unimportant. On the contrary, body and speech facilitate the formation of karma, expanding its effects and reinforcing the depth and strength of the agent's intention. Fourthly, the emphasis on 'mental karma' functions as an important criterion for judgments of good/evil and right/wrong, which carries its own ethical implications worthy of consideration. Towards the end of this section, I offer a preliminary reflection on the possible limitations of the claim. Lastly, I suggest that the emphasis on 'mental karma' not only challenges the philosophical tradition of ancient India, but further allows for reflection and dialogue within the study of contemporary ethics and philosophy. As such, further research on this topic is both meaningful and worthy of pursuit. |