良知的辯證――康德、費希特、牟宗三的理論比較研究

Dialectics of Conscience: A Comparative Study of the Theories of Kant, Fichte and Mou Zongsan

這是一個東西方道德哲學的比較研究，核心問題是良知。在這篇文章中，筆者想要論證，如果不適當地限制良知的有效性範圍，則它會陷入辯證的過程而不能維持其絕對正確的地位。良知包含一種主體自我指涉（Subjektbezug）的意義，也包含一種對象的指涉（Objektbezug）意義。前一個意義是指一種主體內部的實踐理性之自我檢查，不涉及任何具體的義務內容；後者指的是一種涉及對象的具體義務內容。康德主張良知只有第一種意義，因為第二種意義不是良知的事，而是道德判斷力的事。康德認為唯有如此，才能維持良知絕對正確的地位。費希特和牟宗三則認為良知不能只有第一種空洞的形式意義，需要第二種實質的意義，而且還必須保證其絕對正確性。筆者這篇文章想要主張，康德對良知的解釋是對的，費希特和牟宗三的解釋是錯的，理由是第二義的良知無法避免陷入辯證。

The central theme of this paper is the problem of conscience in a context of comparative study of Eastern and Western moral philosophy. I argue that the absolute rightness of conscience cannot be justified if one does not limit the sphere of its validity. Conscience can be understood in two different ways: it can either contain a subjective reference (Subjektbezug) or an objective reference (Objektbezug). Subjective reference means self-examination based on practical reason, while objective reference signifies reference to a concrete content of duty. Kant holds that conscience can only have a subjective reference, because an objective reference is not the task of conscience, but of moral judgment. Both Fichte and Mou Zongsan hold that conscience cannot just have the empty form of subjective reference, but should also contain some concrete substance without losing its absolute rightness. My conclusion is that Kant's interpretation of conscience is right. The reason is quite simple: the objective reference of conscience cannot avoid the difficulty of dialectics.