英文摘要 |
The mainstream studies in mainland China often accuse the Song financial administration of excessive taxation, which is thought to buttress growth in trade. The Marxist historians also emphasize a corresponding relationship between trade and commercial taxation and identify the sixteenth century as the turning point for both an unprecedented expansion of the market and in consequence a substantial transformation of the taxation, especially how commerce was taxed. This paper challenges such a view by comparing the commercial tax collection in the eleventh century with the likin taxes in the late Qing period (1840-1911), both are well-known for collecting revenues by levying goods in circulation. The data-based comparison reveals a striking similarity between the two systems. From an institutional perspective, the accusation against the Song commercial taxes can be hardly accepted, even at face value, if we bring the likin into the comparison. As the late Qing state thirstily attempted to expand the tax basis by adopting the likin tax, it antagonized the public severely. Yet there is a consensus among historians of modern China that this adoption means an essential step “'on the road to success' for China's modern state-builders.” What is underneath the formation of the two indirect-tax-based regimes is the financial crisis both had to face from time to time. The total of the Qing tax revenues tripled from 1753 through 1908. Meanwhile, the land tax, which at the peak of Qing prosperity yielded two-thirds of state revenues, shrunk to one-third, and all taxes from non-agricultural sectors contributed two-thirds. As clearly presented in both the Song and the late Qing histories, the financial crises caused by escalations in the military expenditures often produced the need for innovations in the financial systems. Not the likin alone, but the entire story of the late Qing financial reforms helps to highlight the infrastructural power of the Song state. Pressed by demands from the commercialized, capital-intensive warfare, the late Qing government took a much shorter period (only a half century if one counts the onset of the reform from the Taiping rebellion) to accomplish a similar tax state than did the ruling elite during the Tang-Song transition. Yet in comparison to the short-lived late Qing financial system, which was abruptly thrown away by the revolution, the Song tax mechanism lasted for over three centuries until the Mongol conquest , a length which was by no means ephemeral. |