限制員工權利新股、董事委員會與實質盈餘管理：以台灣上市櫃公司為例

Restricted Stock Grants, Board Committees, and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Publicly-Traded Companies in Taiwan

本文以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討採行「限制員工權利新股」制度是否會影響公司進行實質盈餘管理；並進一步考量監察人、審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重比例所帶來的監督能力提升是否可以對前述關聯性產生抑制效果。除此之外，也在額外分析中，以應計盈餘管理替代實質盈餘管理，並進行前述議題研究。

This research investigates the impact that issuance of restricted stock grants has on real earnings management in publicly-traded companies in Taiwan. I also discuss whether the improvements in supervision under overlapping supervisors/audit committees and remuneration committees have negative impacts on the aforementioned relationship. Finally, I investigate the substitution of real earnings management for accruals management. Using the convergence of interest hypothesis, as a foundation, our findings reveal that the fundamental remuneration strength of restrictedstock grants is not positively associated with the extent to which real earnings management is pursued.